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Abstract. We present a new approach to deal­
ing with default information based on the theory of 
belief functions. Our semantic structures, inspired 
by Adams' e-semantics, are epsilon-belief assign­
ments, where values committed to focal elements 
are either close to 0 or close to 1. We define two 
systems based on these structures, and relate them 
to other non-monotonic systems presented in the 
literature. We show that our second system cor­
rectly addresses the well-known problems of speci­
ficity, irrelevance, blocking of inheritance, ambi­
guity, and redundancy. 
1 . Introduction 
Default reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from 
i) a set of general rules which may have exceptions, and ii) a 
set of facts representing the available information (which is 
often incomplete). The conclusions so drawn are only plausi­
ble and can be revised in the light of the new information. 
The desirable properties for a consequence relation that capture 
default reasoning have been discussed at length in the AI liter­
ature. They can be summarized as follows. 
Rationality: the consequence operator used to generate 
plausible conclusions from a knowledge base should sat­
isfy the rationality postulates proposed by Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor (1990). 
Specificity: results obtained from sub-classes should over­
ride those obtained from super-classes (Touretzky, 1984). 
For example, from the knowledge base 6. = {"Birds fly", 
"Penguins do not fly", "Penguins are birds"}, one should 
deduce that birds which are penguins do not fly, since 
penguins are a subclass of birds. 
Property inheritance: objects should inherit properties 
from super-classes unless there is contradiction on that 
property. For example, from the previous 6., one should 
deduce that birds that are red fly, since being red is irrele­
vant to flying. Also, if we add the rule "Birds have legs", 
then one should deduce that penguins have legs too, since 
having legs is not a conflicting property. Failure to per­
form these deductions is referred to as the problem of 
"irrelevance" and of "inheritance blocking", respectively. 
Ambiguity preservation: in a situation where we have an 
argument in favor of a proposition, and an independent 
argument in favor of its negation, we should not conclude 
anything about that proposition. The most popular ex­
ample is the so-called Nixon-diamond: knowing that 
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"Quakers are pacifists", "Republicans are not pacifists", 
and Nixon is both a Quaker and a republican, one should 
not deduce that Nixon is a pacifist, nor that he is not.l 
Syntax independence: the consequences of a knowledge 
base should not depend on the syntactical form used. In 
particular, they should not be sensitive to duplications of 
rules in the knowledge base ("redundancy"). 
In the last decade there have been several proposals for reason­
ing with default information. Some of them are based on the 
use of uncertainty models such as probability theory (Adams, 
1975; Pearl, 1988), or possibility theory (Dubois and Prade, 
1988; Benferhat et al., 1992). Up to now, however, no single 
system has been reported that correctly addresses all of the 
desiderata above. In this paper, we show how we can use be­
lief functions, originally developed for modeling uncertainty 
(Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988), to build a non-monotonic sys­
tem that gives a satisfactory answer to all of the above issues. 
There have already been a few works on representing default 
information with belief functions (e.g., Hsia, 1991; Smets 
and Hsia, 1991 ). These works require the assessment of nu­
meric values, whose origin is often an open question. 
Finding a solution free from such assessments would some­
how avoid the problem of the origin of the numbers. In this 
paper, we give another interpretation of default information by 
using a class of "extreme" belief functions, called epsilon-be­
lief functions, whose non-null masses are either close to 0 or 
close to 1. The idea of using extreme values is not new to 
plausible reasoning: for instance, Adams (1975) and Pearl 
(1990) use extreme probabilities to encode default informa­
tion; and De Kleer (1990) and Poole ( 1993) use extreme 
probabilities for diagnosis. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next sec­
tion, we give a short reminder on Adams' e-semantics and 
Pearl' System Z, and recall a few notions of the theory of be­
lief functions (see (Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988) for a complete 
exposition). In section 3, we introduce e-belief functions, and 
show how to use them to defme a non-monotonic consequence 
relation. This relation turns out to be too cautious, and we 
define two more relations in sections 4 and 5. The first one is 
based on the least-commitment principle, and is equivalent to 
system Z. The second one uses Dempster's rule of combina­
tion, and is incomparable with the current systems. In section 
6, we study this relation in more detail and show that it cor­
rectly addresses all of the issues above. 
1 Note that this is different from the situation of inconsistency, 
where we have an argument which supports both a conclusion and 
its contrary, as in "a.�P" and "a.�-.p". 
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2 . Background 
We are interested in default rules of the form "generally, if we 
have a then we have w·. where a and � are formulae of some 
underlying language ;£, . For the goals of this paper, we as­
sume that;£, is a classical propositional language. An inter­
pretation for;£, is an assignment of a truth value in {T, F} 
to each formula of ;£, in accordance with the classical rules of 
propositional calculus; we denote by n the set of all such in­
terpretations (also called worlds). We say that an interpreta­
tion ro is a model of a formula a, and write 0> F a iff  
ro(a) = T, and denote by [a] the set of  all the models of a. 
We write a default rule "generally, if a then �" as a-+�. 
where a and � are formulae of;£,. Note that "-+" is a non­
classical arrow, and it should not be confused with material 
implication. Given a default rule d = a-+�. we denote by 4>d 
the formula of ;£, obtained by replacing -+ by material impli­
cation, namely, 4>d = ...,av�. A default base is a multiset 6 = 
{ ai-+�i· i=l, ... ,n} of default rules. We emphasize that a base 
is a multiset rather than a set, i.e., 6 = {a-+�} is different 
from6' ={a-+�, a-+�}. 
We use default bases to represent background knowledge about 
what normally is the case. Given a base 6, we are interested 
in defining a consequence relation t-v between formulae of ;£, 
that tells us which consequences we can reasonably drawn 
from the known facts. We would like 1-v to fulfill the 
desiderata listed above. For example, given the base 6 = 
{b-+f, p-+b, p-+...,f} (where "b" stands for "bird", "f' for 
"flies", and "p" for "penguin"), we would like to have b 1-v f 
and bAp t-v ...,f, but not bAp t-v f .  
2.1. Probabilistic semantics for default rules 
Adams (1975), and later Pearl (1988), have suggested a proba­
bilistic interpretation where a default rule a-+� is read as a 
constraint P(�la) > 1-£, with P a probability distribution and 
£ an infinitesimal positive number. Given a set of defaults 6, 
they construct a class of probability distributions Ae such 
that, for each distribution P in Ae and each default a-+� in 6, 
P(�la) > 1-£. A formula � is said to be an e-consequence 
of a with respect to 6, denoted by at-- £�• if for each Pe Ae 
there exists a real function 0 such that lime-+00(£) = 0 and 
P(�la) > 1-0(£). Said differently, � is a consequence of a 
with respect to 6 if the conditional probability P(�la) is very 
high provided that the conditional probability of each default 
in 6 is very high. Lehmann and Magidor ( 1992) have shown 
that £-consequence is equivalent to the system P of Kraus et 
al (1990), which is commonly regarded as the minimal core of 
any "reasonable" non-monotonic system. 
Adams' £-consequence is not entirely satisfactory. For exam­
ple, it suffers from the problem of irrelevance mentioned 
above: from the default "Generally, birds fly", £-consequence 
does not deduce that red birds fly also. To overcome this limi­
tation, Pearl (1990) has proposed a default reasoning system, 
called Z, based on a ranking of default rules that respects the 
notion of specificity. Given a default base 6 = { ai -+ �i I i 
= 1, ... ,m}, Pearl gives a method to rank-order the rules in 6 
such that the least specific rules (i.e. with most general an­
tecedents) get the least priority. To do this, he defines the no­
tion of tolerance: a rule a -+  � is said to be tolerated by a 
base {ai-+�i· i = 1, ... ,m} iff {aA�, -.a1v�1• . . .  , ...,amv�m} 
is consistent. Then, he partitions 6 into an ordered set { 61, 
62, . . .  , 6k} such that rules in 6i are tolerated by all rules in 
6i u ... u 6k. From this partition, Pearl induces a ranking 
1C on worlds and, from this, a ranking z on formulae. 
Roughly speaking, 1C(O>) corresponds to the index of the low­
est sub-base that contains a rule violated by ro; and z(a) is the 
minimum rank of a model of a -so, z(a) can be read as a 
degree of "abnormality" of a with respect to the rules in 6. 
Finally, Pearl defines a non-monotonic inference relation, de­
noted here by 1-v Z• as follows 
a 1-v z � <=> z(a" �) < z(a" -.�). 
An equivalent treatment of default information has been done 
in the framework of possibility theory (Benferhat et al., 
1992). 
2.2. A reminder on belief functions 
Let n be a finite set of worlds, one of them being the actual 
world. A basic belief assignment on n is a function m: 
2° -+ [0, 1] that satisfies: 2 
m(0) = 0  
.I. m(A) = 1 
Al:!l 
The term m(A), called the basic belief mass given to A, repre­
sents the part of a total and finite amount of belief that sup­
ports the fact that the actual world belongs to A and does not 
support the fact that the actual world belongs to a strict subset 
of A. Any subset A of n for which m(A) > 0 is called a fo­
cal element. 
An agent's belief can equivalently be represented by the func­
tion bel: 2n -+ [0, 1], called a belief function, defined by 
bel(A) = L m (B ) .  
B: B!:A 
The relation between m and bel is one-to-one. The term 
bel( A) represents the degree of belief, of necessary support, 
that the actual world belongs to A. Related to bel is another 
function pl: 2° -+ [0, 1], called a plausibility function, 
given by 
pl(A) = L m (B ) .  
B:  BnA;e0 
The term pl(A) quantifies the degree of plausibility, of poten­
tial support, that the agent could give to the fact that the ac­
tual world belongs to A. When the focal elements of a basic 
belief assignment are singletons, then bel = pl is a probabil­
ity measure. When the focal elements A}. ...• An are nested 
(that is, A1s; . . .  �An). bel is called a consonant belief func­
tion, and bel is a necessity measure and pl is a possibility 
measure (Zadeh, 1978; Dubois and Prade, 1988). When m has 
at most one focal element A ;e n, it is called a simple sup­
port function. 
When a new piece of evidence telling that the actual world be­
longs to A becomes available to the agent, his/her belief is 
revised by the application of the so-called Dempster's rule of 
conditioning. The basic belief mass m(X) that was supporting 
the subset X of n, now supports XnA. This transfer of be­
lief masses is described by the following relation, where 
bel( .lA) denotes the conditional belief function. 
2 In the transferable belief model (Smets and Kennes, 1994), 
belief functions are not necessarily normalized. i.e., we can have 
m(0) > 0. Normalization is assumed here as we only study ratios 
between bel(BIA) and bel(QIA), which corresponds to studying the 
normalized belief functions. 
bel(XuA c) - bel( A c) 
bel(Q) - bel( A c) 
bel(XIA) 
The impact of a piece of evidence E that bears on n is repre­
sented by a belief function bel that describes the agent's be­
liefs on n given E (and nothing else). Suppose the agent re­
ceives two distinct pieces of evidence E1 and E2, and let bell 
and bel2 be the belief functions induced by each evidence indi­
vidually. The combined effect of E1 and E2 is represented by 
the belief function bell E9bel2 obtained by Dempster's rule of 
combination. The corresponding basic belief assignment, de­
noted by m1EBm2. is given by 
3 • Epsilon-belief functions 
In this section, we extend the definition of E-semantics in a 
belief function framework. First, we introduce the notion of 
epsilon-belief functions, whose values are either close to 0 or 
close to 1. Next, we interpret a default rule a-+� as meaning 
that the conditional belief bel([�]l[a]) is close to 1. Finally, 
we define a consequence relation in a natural way: a-+� fol­
lows from a base of defaults 6. if, for each epsilon-belief func­
tion which satisfies all the default rules in 6. (i.e., the condi­
tional belief of each rule is close to 1), we have bel([�]l[a]) 
close to 1. It turns out that this definition gives us the same 
results as Adams' E-consequence relation. 
Definition 1. An epsilon-mass assignment on Q is a func­
tion me: 2°-+[0,1] such that, for each A�O, either 
me(A)=O. or me(A)=EA, or me(A)=l-EA, where EA is an in­
finitesimal. The vector E=(El , ... ,Ek) of the infinitesimals ap­
pearing in me is called the parameter of m. The belief func­
tion induced from me is called an epsilon-belief function (E­
bf). 
Throughout this paper, we denote by bele and piE the belief 
and plausibility functions corresponding to a given epsilon­
mass assignment me· 
Definition 2. Let bele be an E-bf with parameter E. We 
say that bele is an ebf-model of a default rule <X-+�. and write 
bele I= a-+�, iff lime-+0 bele([�]l[a]) = I, where the limit 
is taken with respect to all the elements in E going to 0. 
When working with values that depend on E, we will often 
use the notion of one value being infinitely larger than an­
other, written a >oo b. We say that a >oo b if lime-+0 b/a = 
0. We also say that a and b are of the same order, written 
a = b, if lime-+0 b/a = c, with c *- 0 and finite. The follow­
ing properties will be useful for working with E-bfs.3 
Lemma 1. Let bele be an E-bf. For any a, � e £. , 
a) lime-+0 bele([�]l[a]) = 1 iff ple([<XA�]) >oo ple([<XA...,�]). 
b) ple([a]) 
= 
max{ple(ro)I(J)I:::a}. 
3 The proofs of all the results can be found in the long version of this note: (Benferhat et al., 1995). 
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It is interesting to note that the satisfaction relation I= for E­
bf can also be defined in terms of preferential semantics 
(Shoham, 1988; Kraus et a!., 1990). This will tum out to be 
useful to relate our systems to other existing ones through 
well-known results. To create the link, we associate each E-bf 
bele with a preferential order among worlds in n as follows. 
Definition 3. Let bele be an E-bf on n, and a a formula 
of £. . The bel-preference induced by bele is the partial order 
<e given by: ro <e ro' iff ple({ro'}) >oo ple({ro}). A model 
ro of a is called a bel-preferred model of a if there is no other 
world ro' that satisfies a such that ro' <e ro. 
Lemma 2. Let bele be an E-bf on n. For any a, � formu­
lae of £. , bele I= a-+� if, and only if, each bel-preferred 
model of a satisfies �-
Our next step is to use E-bf models to define the notion of 
entailment for default bases, i.e., to define which conditional 
assertions a-+� are entailed by a default base 6.. Our first 
solution is a direct adaptation of the usual definition of logical 
entailment. We say that an E-bf bele is an Ebf-model of 6., 
written bele I= 6., iff bele is an ebf-model of all the rules in 
6.. We denote by Bele(6.) the set of all the Ebf-models of A. 
Then, a formula � is said to be a bf-consequence of a (w.r.t.. 
to 6.), denoted by a tv bf �. if and only if each E-bf bele of 
Bele(6.) is an ebf-model of a-+�. i.e. 
(BF) a tv bf � iff for any bele in Bele(6.), belel= a-+�. 
Bf-consequence turns out to be equivalent to the system P of 
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990), which in tum is equiva­
lent to Adams' E-system. 
Theorem 1. For a given 6., a tv bf � iff a tv p �-
The proof, given in (Benferhat et a!., 1995), proceeds as fol­
lows. Left to right, note that Adams' infinitesimal probability 
distributions are a special case of our E-bf, and then a tv bf � 
only if a tv E �. only if a tv p �- Right to left, use lemma 2 
to see that each inference relation induced by any bele in 
Bele(6.) is preferential. So, f-.- bf satisfies the rules of P, and 
then it contains all preferential consequences of 6.. 
This result shows that we can use (infinitesimal) belief func­
tions to give an alternative formalization of the systems E and 
P. It also shows that tv bf suffers from the same limitations 
of these systems; in particular, it does not solve the problems 
of irrelevance and blocking of inheritance. In the next two 
sections, we propose two ways to define a more bold conse­
quence relation by restricting our attention in (BF) to just 
some of the models in Bele(6.). 
4 . Entailment based on least-commitment 
One way to select some of the Ebf-models of 6. is by using 
the notion of being minimally informative: intuitively, we 
want to look at the consequences of "only knowing" 6. (and 
nothing more). A similar approach has been taken, for the 
case of possibility measures, by Benferhat et a! (1992). We 
recall the following 
Definition 4. Let bel1 and bel2 two (epsilon-) belief func­
tions over n. Then, bell is less committed that bel2 iff, for 
any A � 0, pl1 (A) � pl2(A). 
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The least-commitment principle (Smets, 1988) states that, in 
order to model an item of information by a belief function, we 
should use the least committed belief function that is compat­
ible with the information. Note that the least committed be­
lief function representing a formula a is given by the simple 
support function that gives mass 1 to [a] and 0 anywhere 
else. We show how to build an ebf-model of A based on this 
principle. We start by allocating a quasi-unitary mass to the 
set [$Al of the worlds where (the propositional equivalent ot) 
all the defaults in A are satisfied, and the remaining mass E to 
.0.. If there were no conflict in the defaults, this allocation 
would be an ebf-model of A. When there are conflicts, how­
ever, this E-bf will not satisfy some of the defaults in A -
namely, those that inherit a conflicting property from a more 
general class. Then, we put aside the defaults that are already 
satisfied, and put almost all of the free mass E on the set 
[$A•] corresponding to the still unsatisfied defaults, leaving a 
small E' on .0.. This new E-bf is an Ebf-model of A' (and of 
A) if we have no conflicts in A'. Otherwise, we iterate the 
procedure until the E-bf will satisfy all the defaults in A. 
More precisely, let E = (Et, ... , En) be a vector of infinitesi­
mals such that 
Ei >oo Ei+ 1 for any i = l, ... , n-1. 
where n is the cardinality of A. We build an E-bf in the fol­
lowing way. 
Step 0. Let i = 0, oo = A, sato = 0, mo s.t. IDQ(.O.) = 1 and 
IDQ(A) = 0 otherwise. 
Step 1. Repeat until oi = 0 
l a. Let i=i+l 
l b. Let oi = oi-l- sati-1 
1c. Let beli be the E-bf given by: 
mi(.Q) = Ei ; mi([$0i]) = mi-l (.0.}- Ei; 
mi(A) = mi-1(A) otherwise. 
ld Let Sati ={de oil belil=d) 
1e. If satj = 0 and Oi;t0 then Fail. 
Step 2. Return beli-1. 
Note that all the focal elements are nested -the inner one be­
ing [$A]- and then the final E-bf returned by Step 2 is a con­
sonant belief function. The procedure fails to find an E-bf if A 
is inconsistent; in this case, we have satj = 0 and oi :;t 0. 
Example 1. Let A = { b � f, p � b, p � ..,f } (where "b" 
stands for "bird", "f' for "flies", and "p" for "penguin"), and let 
us apply the previous algorithm. We have 01 =A, and belt 
given by: mt[$01] = l-Et, m 1 (.0.) = Et • and m1 (.) = 0 else­
where. We compute the set sat1 of defaults which are satisfied 
by belt. We have: 
plt([bAf]) = 1-Et+Et = 1, plt((bA-.f]) = q, 
plt((pAb]) =£I, pll ((pA-.b]) = q, 
plt((pA-.f]) = EJ, plJ((pAf]) = El· 
Therefore, sat1 = {b�f}. We iterate, and get� by removing 
b�f from lit. Then: 
mz(.O.) = ez; mz([$02]) = Et-Ez; 
mz([$o1D.= l-Et; mz(A) = 0 otherwise 
with E l infinitely larger than ez. We have: plz([pAb]) = Et, 
plz([pA..,b]) = ez. plz([pA-.f]) = e1• and plz([pAf]) = e2. All 
the defaults in Oz are satisfied and the algorithm ends by re-
turning belz. • 
We denote by BelLc(A) the family of E-bfs built by the pro-. 
cedure above - the elements of this family differ in the 
choice of E, provided that (ELc)  is satisfied. This family 
"behaves well" for our goals: it is a subset of Bele(A), and it 
induces a unique ordering <e on the worlds in .0.. The latter 
property means that we can decide entailment by just looking 
at one element of BelLc(A). 
Lemma 3. Let A be a default base. Then: 
a) Any element of BelLe( A) is an Ebf-model of A . 
b) Let belt and belz be two elements of BelLe( A), and < 1 and 
<2 the corresponding orderings induced on n. Then,< 1::<2. 
It is interesting to compare BelLc(A) with the result of the 
stratification proposed by Pearl (1988). We can show that the 
focal elements of the partitions of BelLc(A) are directly related 
to the elements of the partition of A obtained by Z. 
Lemma 4. Let A = A 1 u . .. uAn be the stratification given 
by system Z, and let beli the E-bf built by our algorithm at 
step i. Then, for any default a�J3 in A, 
a) a�l3 is tolerated by A iff plt ([aj]) = 1 
b) a�J3eAi iff beli I= a�l3. 
So, our algorithm produf:es the same ranking over A than Z. 
However, our approach does not require an a priori definition 
of the notion of "tolerance", but relies on the notion of being 
"less committed". Which of these two notions provides a 
more natural starting point is a matter of opinion. 
We now use the set BelLc(A) to give our second definition of 
entailment. It is similar to (BF), but we restrict the attention 
to the Ebf-models that are in BelLc(A). 
(LC) a � lc 13 iff for any be lee BelLe( A), bele I= a�l3. 
Example 2. We can use the E-bf belz built in Example 1 
to check that we have bAp � l c  -.f. In fact, we have 
plz((bApA-.f]) = e1, plz((bApAf]) = Ez, and Et>ooEz. 
Hence, by lemma l, lime�O belz([-.f]l[bAp]) = l, and then 
bAp �lc ..,f. • 
As BelLe( A) is a subset of Bele(A}, lc-consequences include 
bf-consequences; in particular, they include the consequences 
of system P. As it turns out, the LC consequence relation is 
strictly larger than �p. and precisely coincides with Pearl's 
system Z, as it appears from lemma 4 above. 
Theorem 2. For a given A, a� 1c 13 iff a � z 13. 
S. Entailment based on Dempster's rule 
The second way that we propose to strengthen the entailment 
relation (BF) is by considering only the ebf-models of A that 
can be built by using Dempster's rule of combination. The 
intuitive argument goes as follows. Suppose we regard each 
default in A as being one item of evidence provided by one of 
several distinct sources of information. 4 Then, it makes sense 
to represent each default individually by one belief function, 
4 The construction given here should extend to the case where 
each source Si of information provides an entire base .ii of 
defaults: we could use the least-commitment principle to build a 
representative belief function for each .1-i as above, and then 
combine these representatives by Dempster's rule. 
and combine these belief functions by Dempster's rule to ob­
tain a representation of the aggregate effect of all the defaults. 
We can then define entailment by looking at the conditionals 
that are satisfied by the combined belief function. 
There are two technical choices to be made. The first one is 
which belief function to use to represent each default. 
Sticking to the arguments used in the last section, we propose 
to use the least committed Ebf that satisfy that default: for a 
default d = IX-+�. this is the simple support function that al­
locates a mass of l-ed to [ ll>dl• and the remaining mass Ed to 
Q. We note by ssfd this function. Given a default base A= 
{ d l•····dn} ,  then, we consider the E-bf obtained by combining 
all the ssfd's by Dempster's rule: 
bele = e{ssfdl de A}.  
The E-bfs obtained in this way may be complex: the focal el­
ements are not nested, and the mass values may include prod­
ucts of several Ed (or l -ed) for different d. Luckily, the plau­
sibility of each world can be approximated in a simple way. 
Lemma 5. Let bele be an E-bf built from A as above. 
Then, for any world (I) in n. 
ple({ro})  "' IT {Ed I de A s.t. COFFtPd}· 
If co satisfies all formulas of A, then ple({ro})=l . The second 
question is how to choose the infinitesimals Ed's. We impose 
constraints on the Ed's  based on the two following principles: 
Auto-deduction principle. We require bele I= a-+� for 
each default a-+� in A (i.e., bele is an ebf-model of A). 
Least commitment principle. We want each ssfd to be as 
un-committed as possible (hence, each Ed should be as 
large as possible). 
For each d = a-+� in A, the first principle generates the con­
straint ( cf. lemma 1) 
max { ple(ro) s.t. ro1= <XA�} >00 max { ple(ro) s.t. ro1= aA-.�} 
which is equivalent to (cf. Lemma 5) 
By solving the system given by all the Cd's, we can get con­
straints of the form Ei >oo Ej between some of the elements 
of E (and between products of elements). The second principle 
can be used to sanction equivalencies between unconstrained 
elements of E by the following argument. Suppose that, for 
some Ei and Ej , neither Ei >00 Ej nor Ej >oo Ei is the case; as 
both Ej and Ej should be made as large as possible, no one can 
be larger than the other, and then Ei = Ej-
We now describe an algorithm to solve a set C of constraints 
of the form (Cd). We call term any product of elements of E, 
and complex term a term containing at least two elements of 
E. The algorithm returns a set�= {�o .. . . .  �n} of equivalence 
classes of terms such that: I) all the terms in a class are of the 
same order; 2)' any term in �i is infinitely larger than any term 
in �j when i < j ;  and 3) any element of E is in some class. 
Step 0. Let i = 0, At={ti I ti is a term and l>ooli is in C} .  
O.a Let �0 be a set o f  Ei such that there exists a 
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O.b. 
Step 1. 
la. 
lb. 
lc. 
l .d. 
I.e. 
1.f. 
Step 2. 
complex term t in At which contains Ei 
If �o=0 then �o=At; else �t=AKO and i=l 
Repeat until C = 0 
Let i=i+ 1. Remove from C any satisfied constraint 
Let At be a set of terms in C which does not 
appear in the right side of any constraint of C 
Let �i be a set of Ei which does not appear in any 
�j<i and where there exists a complex term t 
in At which contains Ei 
If �i :t:. 0 then At :=At -�i and i = i+ 1 
Let AE be the set of Ei which does not appear 
neither in any constraint of C nor in any �j<i· 
Let�j= At + Ae 
Return the sets �j=l,i· 
Example 3. Let again A= {b-+f, p-+-.f, p-+b} .  The sim­
ple support functions corresponding to the three defaults in A 
are given by 
mJ([-.bvt])=l -£1, mt(Q)=Et, 
m2([-.pv-.t]) = 1 -£2, m2(Q) = E2, and 
m3([-.pvb]) = 1 -£3, m3(Q) = E3. 
The requirement of auto-deductivity gives us the following 
three constraints: 
max { pie( { ro} )i(J)I=bAf } >oo max { pie( { ro } )l(l)l::::bA-.f } 
i.e., 1 >co EJ 
max { pie({ ro } )I(J)I=pA-.f} >co max { pie({ ro} )I(J)I=pAf } 
i.e., max{e l , £3} >co £2 
max { pie( { ro} )I(J)I=pAb } >co max { pie( { ro } )l(l)l::::pA -.b } 
i.e., max{EJ. £2} >00 £3 
Let us apply the previous algorithm. The set �0 contains ex­
actly one element £I. When we put eo in the highest value 
then all the constraints will be satisfied. Therefore the result is 
�o={El } , �t={£2. £3} ,  .md £I >co £2 = £3. • 
We denote by Bele(A ) the family of e-bf' s built by 
Dempster's rule and whose parameter E satisfy the constraints 
above. As we did for the BelLc(A) family, we make sure that 
the elements of Bele(A) have the right properties for our 
goals: they are ebf-models of A, and they induce a unique or­
dering on n. 
Lemma 6. Let A be a default base. Then: 
a) Any element of Bele(A) is an ebf-model of A. 
b) Let bel1 and bel2 be elements of Bele(A), and< 1 and <2 
the corresponding orderings induced on n. Then, < 1 =< 2. 
Our third and last definition of entailment, called LCD (Least­
Commitment plus Dempster's rule), is obtained by focusing 
on the Ebf-models that are in Bele(A). 
(LCD) a tv- led � iff for any bele in Bele(A), be lei= IX-+� 
Note that, as all the elements of Bele(A) are ebf-model of A, 
the tv-led relation is as least as strong as tv- bf· In particular, 
tv-led satisfies the KLM properties for system P (Kraus et al., 
1990). In fact, LCD is strictly stronger than P. For exam­
ple, LCD correctly addresses the irrelevance problem, as 
shown by the following example. 
Example 4. We first show how to use the result of the 
previous example to verify that bAp tv- led -.f. In fact, by 
applying lemmas l(b) and 5, we have ple([bApAf]) = e2 and 
ple([bApA-.f]) "'Et• and we know that £I >oo £2. Next, con-
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sider a new property "red" (r) unrelated to b, p and f. We ex­
pect that red birds fly (note that this is not the case in system 
P). For any bel in Bele. and its corresponding pi, we have 
pi([bArAf)) = max {pi([bATAtAp]), pi([bATAfN-.p])} 
= max{Ez,1} = 1 
pl([bi\TA..,f)) = max {pi([bATA..,fAp]), pi([bATA-.fA-.p])} 
= max{Et• Et} = Et 
Hence, we have pl([bArAf]) >oo pl([bArA-.f]), which implies 
bAr tv-led f, as was desired. • 
The following theorem summarizes the relation between 
(LCD) and system P. 
Theorem 3. For a given �. if a. tv- p � then a. tv- led�· 
The converse is not true. 
6 Analysis of LeD-consequence 
We have seen that the LCD consequence relation gives us 
strictly more than system P; in particular, it correctly answers 
the problem of irrelevance. In this section, we study in more 
detail the patterns of reasoning that are captured by LCD. To 
do this, we consider the desiderata listed in the introduction, 
and show how LCD addresses them. We also contrast the 
LCD solution with the one obtained by other existing sys­
tems that go beyond system P. 
We start by property inheritance. Several systems, including 
Pearl's system Z, suffer from the problem of inheritance 
blocking. The canonical example is built by adding to the 
usual penguin problem the default b � I (generally, birds 
have legs). From this, system Z cannot deduce that penguins 
have legs also, i.e., p I* z I. 5 By contrast, LCD allows that 
deduction, as shown below. 
Example 5. Let�= {b�f. p�-.f. p�b. b�l}, where I 
stands for legs. The simple support functions are those in 
Example 3, plus 
m4([-.pvl]) = 1-E4, m4(!l) = E4-
The constraint that pie must satisfy are the same as in 
Example 3, plus 
max {pie( { ro})ICOI=bAI} >oo max {pie({ ro })ICOI=bA-.1} 
i.e., 1 >oo E4 
We apply our algorithm to this set. The first layer, �0· con­
tains exactly two elements: E1 and E4. Once we constraint E1 
and E4 to have the highest value, all the constraints are satis­
fied. Therefore we get: �0 = {E1• E4} >oo �1 = {Ez, E3}. To 
see if penguins have legs, we compute 
pl((pAl]) = max{pl((pAlAbAf)), pl((pAIAbA-.f]), 
pi((pA!A -.bAf)), pJ((pAlA-.bA-.f))} 
=
 
max{Ez, E1, EzE3, Ez} = E1 
pl((pA-.l]) = max { pJ((pA-.lAbAf)), pl((pA-.JAbA-.f)), 
pl((pA-.11\-.bAf)), pJ((pA-.JA-.bA-.f))} 
= max{EzE4, E1E4, E2E3E4, EzE4} = E1E4 
Therefore, pl([pAI]) >e pl([pA-.1]), which implies p tv-led I 
as was desired. • 
5 Goldszmidt and Pearl (1991) have suggested an extension of z. 
called z+, that-correctly handles this example. Unfortunately, z+ 
does not solve the problem of inheritance blocking in general: if 
we add the rules "Generally, legless birds are birds" and 
"Generally, legless birds do not have legs" to our base, then Z + 
cannot deduce both of "Legless birds fly" and "Penguins have 
legs"-it will just deduce one of them, depending on the ranking. 
This problem is solved by LCD. 
Another desiderata listed in the introduction was the ability to 
stay uncommitted in cases of ambiguity. The following ex­
ample shows a case of ambiguity where system Z would de­
duce an undesired result, while LCD does not. 
Example 6. Let� ={b�f. p�-.f. p�b. m�f}, where the 
last default means "Generally, objects with metal-wings fly." 
The simple support functions are again those in Example 3, 
plus the following one: 
m4([-.mvf]) = 1- E4, m4(!l) = E4. 
The constraints that pie must satisfy are the same as in 
Example 3, plus 
max {Pie{{ ro} )ICOI=mAf} >oo max {pie({ ro})ICOI=mA-.f} 
i.e., 1 >00 E4 
We get the same ordering as before, with e4 in the top class: 
�0 = {E1• E4} >oo �1 = {Ez, E3}. Consider now a bird that is 
a penguin and has metal wing. Given the base�. we can not 
say whether or not this beast will fly - we are in a case of 
ambiguity. And indeed we have: 
pl([bApAmAf)) = Ez 
pi([bApAmA-.f]) "'E1E4. 
As the ordering above says nothing of the relative magnitude 
of Ez and E 1 E4, we do not have neither bApAm tv-led f nor 
bApAm tv-led -.f. Notice, by contrast, that Z would give us 
the arbitrary result bApAm tv- z ..... f. • 
The following theorem summarizes the relation between LCD 
and system Z. 
Theorem 4. The consequence relations tv-led and tv-z are 
incomparable. 
The last desiderata in the introduction was syntax-indepen­
dence. The following example shows that LCD is not sensi­
tive to duplications of rules in the default base. 
Example 7. Consider a variant of the Quaker-Republican 
problem where the rule "Generally, Quaker are pacifists" has 
been duplicated: � = { q�p. q�p. r�-.p}. By using a lexico­
graphic approach, we would deduce qAr � p, while we would 
prefer to acknowledge the ambiguity and deduce nothing. In 
LCD, we have 
m1([-.qvp])= 1-EJ, mt(O)=EJ, 
mz([.....qvp]) = 1-ez, mz(!l) = ez, 
m3([ ..... rv ..... p]) = 1- E3, m3(!l} = E3, 
together with the constraints 
1 >oo Et Ez, l >co E1 Ez. 1 >oo E3 
By applying our algorithm, we get one single class, and so 
E3=e1ez. Then 
pi((QATAp]) "'E3 and pl((qArA-.pJ: >t Ez, 
and hence, as desired, we have neither qAr tv-led p nor 
QAr tv-led -.p. • 
We have shown that the LCD consequence relation behaves 
well with respect to all of the desiderata stated in the introduc­
tion. Unfortunately, there are cases where LCD gives us re­
sults whose intuitive acceptability is questionable. 
Example 8. Consider the Quaker-Republican problem with 
the extra rule "Generally, ecologists are pacifist": � = { q�p. 
e�p. r�-.p}. We have 
m1([-.qvp])=1-E1, m1(Q)=EJ, 
m2([-.evp]) = 1-E2. m2(!l) = E2. 
m3([-.rv-.p]) = 1-E3, m3(0) = E3, 
together with the constraints 
1 >00 £1, 1 >oo £2, 1 >oo £3 
Since all the elements of e are free, our algorithm puts all of 
them in the same class, i.e., £1 = £2 = £3. Then, we have 
pl([qAMrAp]) 
== £3 >00 pl([qAeArA-.p]) == £1 £2• 
and so ecologists who are Quakers and republicans are pacifist: 
qAMr lv led p. • 
The last example may be disappointing, in that we may con­
sider that we are in a case of ambiguity and we should stay 
silent. The reason for the answer given by LCD is to be 
found in the multi-source interpretation of the approach: hav­
ing two sources to independently justify a conclusion is re­
garded as a stronger reason to accept that conclusion. The as­
sumption of independence between the sources is essential to 
use Dempster's rule of combination; it may be interesting to 
study variants of LCD based on different rules of combination. 
7. Three special cases 
The LCD consequence relation has been built by giving each 
default d an infinitesimal weight Ed. and combining these 
weights by Dempster's rule of combination. We then used 
the auto-deduction and least-commitment principles to con­
strain the possible values of the Ed's. As an alternative, we 
could have imposed some a-priori relation between the Ed's. 
In this section, we show three special cases of consequence re­
lations obtained in the second way. The relations we get are 
already known in the literature: in the first case, we get the 
so-called "penalty logic" (Pinkas, 1992; Dupin et al., 1994); 
in the second case, we get the lexicographic approach (Dubois 
et al., 1992; Benferhat et al., 1993; Lehmann, 1993); and the 
last case leads to the preferred sub-theories of Brewka (1989). 
Consider a default base .i, and let {A(}, .i1, . . . .  lin } be the 
partition of .i given by System Z. As we did for LCD, we 
associate each default d in .i with the following simple sup­
port function 
ffid([<l>dD = 1-€(!, ffid(Q) = £d, ffid(elsewhere) = 0. 
The three special cases we want to analyze are obtained by fix­
ing the value of the £d's intinitesimals as follows. 
For the tist case, we choose one "global" intinitesimal £, and 
we let, for each de .iio Ed = ei. Then by applying Dempster's 
rule of combination we get for each interpretation: 
ple({ro}) .. n {Ed I deli s.t. rol=l=<l>dl· 
= n. e<i ·ki(ro)) t=l,n 
= e[ Li=l,n (i ·ki(ro)) ], 
where ki(ro) is the number of defaults of Iii which are not sat­
isfied by the interpretation ro. We can interpret the resulting 
mass assignment me in terms of costs: each piece of infor-
mation d of Iii is associated to the cost c(d)=i, interpreted as 
the price to pay if d is not satisfied. Then each interpretation 
ro is associated the sum of the costs of pieces of information 
of .i which are falsified by ro, namely: 
C(ro)=I.o#<l>d• de6. c(d) 
We can show �at 
C(ro) < C(ro') iff Ple(ro) >oo Ple(ro'). 
(Obvious, since ple (ro) = eLi=I,n [i ·ki(ro)] = eC(E). ) 
Hence, the non-monotonic consequence relation obtained by 
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using Dempster's combination and the Ed's defined above 
generates the same results as the inference relation based on 
penalty logic (Pinkas, 1991; Dupin et al., 1994). 
For the second case, we equate all the Ed's of the defaults d 
that belong to the same layer Iii. More precisely, we associ­
ate an infinitesimal Ei to each layer Iii. and, for each de Iii. let 
Ed= Ei. We then ask that q is a positive real number in­
finitely small, and that, for any i > 1, 
i-1 
n Ej idjl >oo Ei , 
j=l 
where l.ijl is number of default rules in the stratum .ij. We can 
show that the order on different interpretations obtained by 
using these £d's can be characterized as follows, where [ro]i is 
the number of defaults of Iii satisfied by ro. 
Proposition 1. pl(ro) >oopl(ro') if and only if there exist 
a positive number l�i<n such that: 
• Vj>i, l[ro]jl=l[ro']jl. and 
• l[ro]il>l[ro']il 
This ordering corresponds to the so-called Lexicographical or­
dering defined in (Dubois et al., 1992; Benferhat et al., 1993; 
Lehmann, 1993), and hence the consequence relation obtained 
by using Dempster's combination and the Ed's defmed above 
is the same as the one obtained by the lexicographic ap­
proaches. This ordering has also been considered in diagnosis 
by De Kleer (1990) and Lang (1994). 
For the last case, let dij be the j-th default (according to some 
arbitrary enumeration) in the i-th layer lij. Then, we associate 
dij to an infinitesimal Eij such that: 
for a given i, Eij and Eik for k*.j are incomparable, 
E1j are positive real numbers infinitely small, and 
fij=l,i-1 fik=l ,l.ijl Ejk >oo Ei! for l=l,l.iil, and i>l 
where l.ixl is number of default rules in layer <ix. Then, we 
can show that the order on the interpretations can be character­
ized in the following way, where [ro]i is the number of de­
faults of Iii satistied by ro. 
Proposition 2. pl({ro}) >oo pl({ro'} )  if and only if there 
exist a positive number 19<n such that: 
• Vj>i, [ro]j=[ro']j. and 
• [ro]i :2 [ro']i (and not [ro']j :1 [ro]i). 
This ordering corresponds to the preferred sub-theories origi­
nally proposed by Brewka (1989), and later independently in­
troduced in (Dubois et al., 1992) in the setting of possibilistic 
logic. 6 Hence, the consequence relation obtained by using 
Dempster's combination and the Ed's defined above is the 
same as the one obtained by the system of Brewka. 
As it is the case for our LCD system. all the three particular 
cases discussed in this section are strictly stronger than system 
P. In general, we state the following: 
Theorem 5. LeD-consequence is incomparable with all of: 
penalty logic; the lexicographic approaches; and the preferred 
sub-theories approach. 
6 Brewka's preferred subtheories have also been used by 
Boutilier ( 1992) in system Z to define a nonmonotonic infer­
ence relation, and by Baral (1992) to combine belief bases. 
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8 • Conclusions 
We have detailed a new approach to deal with default informa­
tion based on a special class of belief functions, and have used 
it to define three non-monotonic consequence relations. The 
last one, LCD-consequence, appears to be particularly attrac­
tive. We have proved that LCD is stronger than system P, 
and thus it satisfies the rationality postulates of Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor (1990). Moreover, we have given ex­
amples showing that LCD correctly addresses the well-known 
problems of irrelevance (example 4); of blocking of inheri­
tance (example 5); of ambiguity (example 6); and of redun­
dancy (example 7). In this, LCD has a distinctive advantage 
over all currently existing approaches. Finally, we have 
shown that the construction used to defme LCD can be used to 
build alternative definitions of several existing systems of de­
fault reasoning, including penalty logic, the lexicographic ap­
proach, and Brewka's preferred sub-theories. Hence, our be­
lief-function based semantics for defaults appears to be able to 
capture many of the current systems in a common framework. 
It is interesting to notice that, despite its good behaviour, 
LCD does not satisfy rational monotonicity. We. 'a!e currently 
studying different rules that can characterize LeD-consequence. 
Moreover, although LCD is insensitive to the number of rep­
etitions of the same default rule, it is sensitive to the number 
of different rules supporting the same conclusion. This is not 
surprising given that LCD is based on the interpretation of de­
faults as items of information provided by independent 
sources. We plan to explore variants of LCD that abandon the 
assumption of independence. 
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